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We develop a semi-structural price vector autoregression to capture coffee price 
dynamics over various time horizons.  The presence of the International Coffee 
Agreement is permitted to alter supply responses to price signals through yield and 
planting effects.  In the short run, the ICA caused Brazilian farm prices to become 
disconnected from international prices.  In the long run, the ICA promoted supply 
response by providing a stable environment in which producers could use current price 
information to predict future prices.  In the intermediate run, it muted supply response by 
necessitating an institutional price wedge between wholesale and farm level prices.  In 
net, the ICA created a price cycle that does not exist in non-ICA periods.  Oxfam’s 
proposal to burn 300 million pounds of coffee will provide temporary relief to farmers, 
but cannot be used repeatedly as a long term strategy.  The low coffee prices experienced 
since the disintegration of the ICA may be due to the interaction of supply lags, a shift in 
the composition of coffee demand, and low price response due to price uncertainty.  No 
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I.  Introduction 
The last century saw four separate attempts to control international coffee prices.  This is 
hardly surprising given: the impact of coffee prices on producing nations’ terms of trade and 
welfare; the sensitivity of coffee supply to droughts and frosts; the medium term price inelasticity 
of supply; the inelasticity of coffee demand; and the consequent volatility of prices.  Each of 
these agreements was successful for a time, but eventually ended amidst disagreements between 
signatory nations.  The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) was the last of these attempts, in 
effect intermittently from 1962 until 1989.   
Prices have been low since the collapse of the ICA, although two frosts in Brazil muddle 
this impression (see figure 1).  While green coffee prices do dip periodically, 2002 saw prices 
lower than they have been since 1967, in nominal terms.  The disastrous welfare consequences of 
this price trough have prompted renewed interest in international price intervention.  Oxfam 
(2002) calls for the burning of 5 million 60 lb. bags of coffee, as well as “quality controls” 
requiring the exclusion of a significant portion of coffee supply from the market.  The 
International Coffee Organization (ICO) is also calling for quality controls.  Meanwhile, many 
involved with the ‘fair trade’ movement advocate for market-wide price guarantees.  It is 
therefore fitting to study the impacts of previous interventions.  This should allow insight into 
whether such agreements are advisable, and if so, how to better ensure their longevity. 
Prior econometric work
1 assessing the impact of the ICA quota system on 
contemporaneous coffee prices has run into difficulty. This is primarily because, under the ICA, 
low prices activated the treaty’s economic provisions (quotas).  This creates a simultaneity 
problem which makes the impact of the agreement on prices impossible to measure from a simple 
time-series model.  Amongst the structural attempts to capture coffee price determination, 
Akiyama and Varangis (1990) develop a model of world markets which models coffee production 
and stocks explicitly.  Their results suggest that the ICA reduced price volatility by encouraging 
the build-up of stocks during quota years.  When subsequent supply shocks caused prices to rise 
and the quotas to be suspended, the release of these stocks reduced the magnitude of the price 
spike.  Thus, the ICA appears, in these studies, to stabilize prices in the short and medium run.   
Such structural studies, however, fail to adequately incorporate price dynamics.  They 
presume that planting and other supply responses to price information are unaffected by the ICA.  
Economic theory regarding investments under uncertainty suggests that this presumption may be 
                                                 
1 See, for example: Akiyama & Varangis (1990), Coggins (1996), Vogelvang (1988), Palm & Vogelvan 
(1991). 
  2inappropriate.  The agreement was designed to alter the forward path of prices, and hence the 
expected returns to investments conditional on recent prices.  This could alter supply behavior 
with substantial implications for future prices.  Traditional time series work on coffee prices, 
limited as it is by its inability to identify structural economic parameters, is also unable to shed 
light on the subject.   
In order to bridge this gap, we develop a semi-structural time series specification in the 
price domain.  We model the impact of long ago prices on investments in coffee trees, and 
therefore on current prices.  By permitting these long ago impacts to differ depending on whether 
the ICA was in place at the time of the investment, we allow the data to express the long term 
dynamic effects of the agreement.  We are careful to account for the effects of weather, inventory 
accumulation and temporal effects.  Our model is embedded in a flexible vector autoregression 
form devised by Chavas and Mehta (2004) to capture potentially asymmetric price transmission 
in a vertical sector.   
This methodology is employed to answer four questions, all relating to long term supply 
adjustment under uncertainty.  Coffee trees, once planted, take four to five years to become 
productive, and remain productive for fifteen to twenty-five years thereafter.  In combination with 
the view that coffee prices are nearly impossible to predict at the five year horizon and that 
farmers therefore rely on adaptive expectations when investing, this suggests the potential for a 
coffee price cycle.  We therefore ask, first, whether the ICA had an impact on the existence and 
magnitude of such a cycle, and if so, why.  We argue that the agreement did induce a price cycle, 
because it created a stable investment environment in which farmers and governments could 
forge long term supply responses to current prices. 
Second, we ask whether supply responds to price information in the post-ICA years, and 
whether this helps us to understand the low prices experienced during this time. We find that 
aggregate supply responds little to price information.  Technological changes that have increased 
the competitive advantage of “lower quality” coffees have led to large supply increases on the 
part of their producers, especially Brazil and Vietnam.  Other producers have been slow to cut 
back on supply.  While this owes much to the long term nature of crop, we argue that the duration 
of the price trough is connected to an inability to respond to such information under price 
uncertainty. 
Third, we ask what the impact would be of Oxfam’s suggested policy of raising prices by 
burning five million bags of coffee.  Our simulations suggest that in the absence of a price control 
agreement, the impact of such a policy would be felt for a year and taper off to nothing within 
two years.  During the ICA years, such a policy would have triggered a price cycle. 
  3Fourth, we ask whether price transmission in coffee markets between the Brazilian farm 
sector, U.S. wholesale sector and U.S. retail sectors is asymmetric, as has been alleged by many 
concerned with the increased market concentration at the roasting/retail level since the late 1980s.  
We find that the evidence of this is weak.  
In the next section, we present the economic features of the agreement salient to 
understanding coffee supply response.  Section III presents our data.  Section IV derives our 
econometric specification, and details how ICA activity might be expressed in price dynamics.  
Section V provides and interprets the regression results.  Section VI presents the results to our 
policy simulation exercises.  Results on price transmission exercises are presented in section VII.  
Section VIII discusses our findings, their policy implications, and concludes.  
 
II.  Supply response under the ICA 
The international coffee agreement was signed in 1962 by a large majority of the coffee 
producing and consuming nations of the world.  It collapsed at the end of the cold war in July 
1989, perhaps reflecting its fundamentally political purpose from the perspective of some 
participants.  During the period covered by our data, the agreement operated through a flexible 
quota system.  A price index, calculated by the ICO, was established to synthesize price 
information from different sectors of the global wholesale market.  A graduated series of export 
quotas was also agreed upon.  Quota levels were tightened when the price index fell below 
$1.20/lb, and loosened when it rose above $1.40/lb.  During periods of drought, when prices rose 
substantially, the quotas were suspended altogether.  Internationally, the quota system was 
enforced through the requirement that exports to signatory importing nations be backed by 
coupons. 
The task of ensuring that the quantity restrictions mandated by the agreement were met 
fell to national coffee boards and governments in producing countries.  These coffee authorities 
were compelled to drive a wedge between high (relative to market clearing) international prices 
and farm prices in order to balance production levels with export allowances.  This was done 
through direct taxation of coffee production and sales, the requirement that coffee be sold at 
discriminatory exchange rates, or purchasing programs.  This price wedge, which is visually 
apparent in figure 1, clearly generated substantial quota rents.  The distribution of such quota 
rents lie at the heart of any discussion of the equity implications of international price controls.  
Indeed, understanding how these quota rents were distributed under the ICA may explain why the 
US State Department was eager to enter into an agreement that would raise US coffee prices. 
  4For current purposes, however, we are concerned with the impact of adjustments in the 
wholesale – farm price wedge on the incentives to plant coffee.  Under the ICA, authorities had 
incentives to adjust the price wedge in response to price fluctuations in order to dampen the 
impact of price shocks.  Failure to do so would have resulted in overproduction, the storage and 
management of which would have been expensive.  From this perspective, the existence of the 
ICA should have dampened supply response through these price wedge effects.  In the extreme 
case, if authorities over-reacted to price fluctuations, overshooting price wedge adjustments could 
even have reversed supply responses.  To wit: if wholesale price increases induced authorities to 
increase the price wedge sufficiently to reduce the farm price, then supply could have actually 
contracted as a result. 
Conversely, the price stabilization effects of the ICA should contribute to a magnification 
of supply response.  Because the ICA stabilized the forward path of prices, it provided farmers 
with a stable investment planning horizon.  Hence, current price information may have become a 
more useful predictor of future prices, prompting investments in trees through planting and 
maintenance to respond to price signals.  The overall effect of the ICA on supply response, then, 
remains an empirical question.  National coffee boards and governments have incentives to 
dampen supply response in order to avoid the management and storage costs association with 
overproduction, while the effects of the agreement on the investment decisions of farmers act in a 
countervailing fashion. 
   
III.  The Data 
  All price data are in nominal terms and measure a monthly average price in dollars per 
pound.  Farm prices from Brazil were provided by the ICO, and were converted to U.S. dollars at 
contemporaneous exchange rates. Retail prices are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and 
reflect the price of ground coffee only.  Prices of whole bean gourmet coffee and coffee drinks 
are not reflected in this price.  The bulk of the green coffees used in ground blends are Brazilian 
and lower grade Columbian Arabica coffees, as well as Asian and Brazilian Robusta beans.  We 
have, therefore chosen to utilize wholesale price information on the monthly average spot price of 
‘Brazilian and Other Natural Arabicas’ determined at the New York Board of Trade.   
 Because wholesale prices of the different varieties of coffee co-move, much can be learned about 
aggregate market behavior from an examination of just this one wholesale price indicator. 
Dates for weather shocks are drawn from the ICO and from Bates (1997). 
 
 
  5IV.  Econometric Specification 
Our econometric model consists of a structurally derived wholesale price determination 
equation, couched within a vector autoregression (VAR) model allowing for conditional 
heteroskedasticity.  Beginning with the outer shell, the VAR is specified as follows: 
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Here pt is a vector of farm ( )
F
t p , wholesale( )
W
t p , and retail( )
R
t p  prices.  It is conditioned on 
lagged values of the price vector and a vector of exogenous variables( ) t x , including a time trend, 
seasonal dummy variables, and indicators of whether the ICA was in effect in the recent past.  
The error vector possesses a conditionally heteroskedastic normal distribution.  This is allowed 
for using a Cholesky decomposition to ensure a positive semi-definite variance matrix. 




































































(1c)   ( ) 1 , 1, − − = t t t it z z p a a  
Dummies indicating periods when the market faced unexpected weather shocks, and when ICA 
was in place are included in zt.  Mathematically, these equations imply (collecting the time 
subscripts for convenience): 
 (1d)    
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Thus, the time varying Cholesky matrix ( ) t A  allows price volatility in sector i ( )
2
it σ  and the 
covariance of price shocks in sectors i and j ( ) ijt σ  to vary with market conditions ( , weather 
events (where the dummy Sh
) 1 − t p
τ = 1 if t = τ, where there were weather shocks in the months 
considered), and the presence of the ICA in the month prior (indicated by the dummy dt-1). 
  Changes in the supply of substitute coffee varieties will effect our wholesale price 
indicator as they would their own.  Farm prices may be shielded from such movements by price 
wedges.  Similarly, retail prices may not reflect such movements well due to market power and 
  6private stock-holding.  We therefore place the wholesale price equation at the center of our model 
to capture aggregate behavior in world markets.  Past wholesale prices condition current retail 
and farm prices, and vice versa.  However, past farm prices do not affect current retail prices, nor 
vice versa, except through the wholesale market.
2  We use the wholesale price equation to capture 
long term dynamics. We therefore turn now to determining a suitable form for the wholesale price 
equation. 
  We begin with a tree-stock equation, relating the current tree stock ( ) t N  to that last year 
 and the number of new trees currently entering into production ( 12 − t N ) t ϕ . 
(2)  t t t N N ϕ β + = −12  
() β − 1  is the annual depreciation rate of trees.  Output of beans ( ) t Y  is determined by the 
number of trees and the yield per tree( ) t b . 
(3)    t t t N b Y =
Inverse demand is given by: 
(4)  ;  t t
W
t cQ a p − =
where Qt is the quantity demanded.  This linear specification has the desirable property that 
demand elasticity increases with the price.  This is a property of coffee demand, according to 
Junguito and Pizano (1999).Finally, the market clears through inventory accumulation :  () t I ∆
(5)  .  t t t I Q Y ∆ + =
  Applying the lag operator to (2) and solving (2)-(5) for   yields: 
W
t p




t cb I c a L p p ϕ β β − ∆ + − + = −
12
12 1 . 
  Turning next to the short run dynamics of the system, we note that demand may shift 
over time  and with the seasons, which we put capture through three quarterly dummy 
variables.
() t
3  Hence: 
(7)    () 3 2 1 , , , Q Q Q t a at =
Inventory accumulation decisions are made with reference to recent prices( ) r t t p p − − ,.., 1
4, and 
may depend upon whether the ICA was in place last month or not.   
                                                 
2 Each of these restrictions was tested via likelihood ratio tests and accepted. 
3 In our specification the first quarter begins in January.  Using a quarter scheme commencing in February 
or March yielded slightly lower likelihood scores. 
4 Using the Schwartz criterion we chose r  = 2.  
  7(8)  .  () r t t t t t p p p ICA I I − − − − ∆ = ∆ ,.., , , 2 1 1
  The medium run dynamics of the system are driven by yield effects, while the long run 
dynamics come from planting.  As discussed in section II, the impact of prices in the past on 
prices today through yields and planting may be conditioned by the presence of an agreement 
through price wedge and price stabilization effects.  Note also, that the trees just entering into 
production at time t were planted four or five years ago; and that their yields will depend on 
inputs of labor, mulch, fertilizer, irrigation and on pruning decisions one to three years prior.  The 
following specification is immediate: 
(9)    () III III III II II II I I I t ICA P P ICA P P ICA P P b b * , ; * , ; * , =
(10)  () V V V IV IV IV t ICA P P ICA P P * , ; * , ϕ ϕ = ; 
where upper case prices with Roman subscripts represent lagged annual wholesale price averages.  
Thus, for example, PIV*ICAIV  represents the average wholesale price four years ago, multiplied 
by the fraction of that year for which the ICA was operative. 
Substituting (7)-(10) into (6) yields a specification that is specified purely in terms of 
prices.  Notice, from the lag operator in (6) that if pt-1 conditions wholesale prices, then pt-13 must 
do so as well. 
Presuming, for simplicity, linear functional forms for (6)-(10), we run into a common 
identification problem.  In particular, we find that c is not identified, and that the magnitudes of bt 
and φt cannot be separately determined.  Hence we estimate multiplicative combinations of these 
parameters with others, yielding measures of their relative importance in driving price dynamics.  
Suppressing the full algebraic form for the short term effects for notational reasons, this yields: 
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Now, suppose, for example, that .  Then, finding that   
would indicate that the price stabilization effects of the ICA dominate its price wedge effects at 
the five year time horizon, and that the ICA stimulates supply response to prices.  Finding, that 
, would indicate that, under the ICA, price increases five years ago are associated 
with price decreases today (holding all price dynamics in the interim constant), and vice versa. 
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  The number of months of lagged prices to condition retail and farm level prices on was 
determined using the Schwartz criterion to be 2.   
  8 
V.  Regression Results 
We estimated the specification provided by embedding (6) in (1) using maximum 
likelihood.
5  The short term effects were expressed in terms of differences, without loss, as 
differencing allows for simple extensions to test for asymmetric price transmission.  Estimates of 
the price equation (1) are presented in table 1, while estimates of the Cholesky element equations 
are provided in table 2.   
The impact of the ICA on average prices is not consistent in sign across sectors, and is 
statistically insignificant.  This may reflect the same simultaneity issues that previous studies 
have encountered.   
Seasonal effects are jointly significant. 
Only retail prices display a statistically significant upward trend.  However, relative to 
wholesale prices the trend is statistically insignificant, amounting to a two cent increase in the 
retail-wholesale margin over ten years.  Farm prices decline, though not statistically significantly.  
Growth in the retail-farm margin is statistically, but not economically, significant, totaling seven 
cents in ten years. 
  We begin our analysis by looking at contemporaneous price transmission.  From the 
elements of the Cholesky matrix, we can calculate coefficients of contemporaneous price transfer 
between sectors.  For example, from (1d) we note that a one dollar shock in retail prices will 




t WR p p C   t t Rt WRt a a 3 5
2 = σ σ dollars.   
Figure 2a depicts these coefficients between farm and wholesale prices across our sample 
period.  The results are fascinating.  Note that in the period since the dissolution of the ICA, both 
CWF and CFW are almost exactly equal to one.  Thus contemporaneous price transmission between 
these sectors is close to perfect without the agreement.  A price shock in one sector is transmitted 
fully, within the same month, to the other.  During the ICA, these transfer coefficients are much 
smaller, averaging around 0.3 and occasionally even falling into the negative region.  This is 
compelling evidence that price wedges during the ICA years dampened price transfer between the 
farm and wholesale sector.   
                                                 
5 The model of fundamental wholesale price determination under perfect market intelligence detailed above 
yields multiple identification restrictions which relate ratios of coefficients on past prices to β.  Likelihood 
ratio tests of these restrictions found them to be unacceptable.  While back of the envelope calculations 
suggest values for β between 0.9 and 0.93, the model consistently puts β at around 0.1.  We take this as an 
indication that short term dynamics are not driven by fundamentals alone.  We also relax all the 
identification restrictions. 
  9This evidence in favor of a price wedge view of the ICA’s effects is well complimented 
by the statistical insignificance of wholesale prices in determining farm prices.  Thus, under the 
ICA, when only lagged farm prices have statistically significant effects on farm prices, the 
transfer of wholesale shocks to farm prices is slow, with farm prices assuming a momentum of 
their own.  Such momentum probably arises from political and inventory management pressures 
arising out of the need to conform to quota restrictions. 
  Figures 2b and 2c provide analogous coefficients for transfer to and from the retail sector.  
Contemporaneous price transmission between the retail sector and the farm or wholesale sectors 
is poor, averaging zero, and frequently negative.  Negative price transmission coefficients occur if 
and only if the covariance between shocks is negative.  The only convincing explanation that we 
have for the negative covariances with the retail sector is shocks to the marketing margin.  That is 
to say, if the effects of consolidation at the roasting level on prices are not captured by our simple 
linear time trend, then ‘unpredicted’ prices effects of consolidation will be associated with retail 
price increases relative to wholesale and farm-level prices.  This is exactly what we see during the 
period when consolidation proceeded apace. 
Turning next to our estimates of the intermediate run effects of the ICA, we note that   
and   are statistically significant and positive.  The total price effects,b  and   are 
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t is positive at every point in our sample, this suggests that under the 
ICA, wholesale price increases one or two years in the past would actually reduce current supply, 
presuming that they didn’t change prices in the interim.  We take this as evidence that price 
wedge effects dominate the price stabilization effects of the ICA in the intermediate term, and 
that national managers overshoot in their determination of appropriate price wedges. 
.  In order to assess the economic importance of these intermediate term price wedge 
effects, we calculated the partial derivatives of current prices with respect to annual prices one 
(D1), two (D2) and three (D3) years prior.  These are presented in figure 3.  The results indicate 
clearly that overshooting price wedge effects on yield are economically important during the ICA 
years.  One dollar price increases one and two years ago result in price increases today of around 
a dollar.  The results during the non-ICA years stand in stark comparison.  The one year effect 
becomes negative, consistent with standard supply response, while the two year effect essentially 
disappears.  This is strong evidence that the ICA elicited supply responses. 
  In the case of long term, planting effects, the price stabilization effects of the agreement 
dominate ( ) 0 <
A
V ϕ .   This creates large supply responses to price changes which disappear when 
the ICA is not in effect (see figure 4).   A ten cent price increase five years ago generates 
  10approximately a 20 cent price decrease today when the ICA is in effect.  When it is not, the 
impact of the price increase is close to zero. 
These results provide compelling evidence that enforcement of the ICA was associated 
with significant price wedge management, including some overshooting, that it dampened price 
transmission between the wholesale and retail sectors, and that by stabilizing prices, it generated 
strong incentives to respond to price increases by planting trees.  However, even the partial 
derivatives calculated do not provide empirically usable estimates of the impact of the ICA on the 
links between past and future prices.  This is because price shocks affect all future prices, 
violating ceteris paribus assumptions that these comparisons require.  We therefore turn to policy 
simulations.  
  
V.  Policy Simulation Results 
 
We conducted Monte Carlo simulations of one thousand iterations to uncover the impact 
of shocks on this system.  Each iteration was conducted as follows:  First, a random matrix of 
standard normal i.i.d. disturbances was generated, corresponding to εt.  Then, picking conditions 
at a given date as starting values, the process was simulated forward.  Next, a shock was 
introduced in the first period of simulation, the simulation was repeated, and the impulse response 
was calculated as the difference between the shocked and shocked price paths.  All of these 





th percentiles of their 
distribution at each point in time are plotted in figures 5 and 6. 
The shock sizes simulated attempt to capture the effects of Oxfam’s proposed burning of 
five million bags of coffee.  The calculation combines figures for total annual world output from 
the ICO, with information about the current wholesale price and a demand elasticity to calculate 
the initial wholesale price shock that this would generate.  Junguito and Pizano (1997) report 
demand elasticities between -0.2 and -0.4.  We therefore picked an elasticity of -0.3.  We 
calculate that Oxfam’s proposals would result in a 28 cent price shock in July 1985, and a 14 cent 
price shock in December 2002.  The ICA was in effect at the former date, but not the latter.  Our 
simulations therefore assume the presence of an agreement for the 1985 simulations, but not the 
2002 simulations. 
Figures 5a and 5b demonstrate the effect of the shock in 2002.  There is very mild 
evidence of cycling in the wholesale response, but no disastrous countervailing price response.  
Farm prices, on the other hand, do not display a cycle.  The single peaked effect of the exercise 
on farm prices is modest, both in terms of magnitude and duration.  They rise from about 15 
  11cents/lb up to 17 cents, and then fall to 10 cents within a year and 4 cents within two.  Thus the 
gains to producers from the move are middling.   
Figures 6a and 6b present the results of the same burning policy under the ICA in 1985.  
There is clear evidence from the wholesale response that the shock generates a price cycle.  
Indeed, the wholesale price responds much like our coefficients suggested it would.  Wholesale 
prices experience a little lift one and two years into the simulation, but reach a 7 cent trough 
about five-six years in.  Farm prices also cycle in response to the shock, although the phase of this 
cycle does not match that of the wholesale cycle. 
All the forgoing results indicate that our findings of exaggerated supply response under 
the ICA are economically meaningful.  The ICA did, indeed, deepen the coffee price cycle.   
 
VI.  Introducing Price Transmission 
The argument that retail coffee prices respond asymmetrically to wholesale price 
movements has been made often.  For example, Talbot (1997) p.68, points out that following a 
Brazilian drought in 1986 which raised wholesale prices, retail prices rose as well, but didn’t 
come back down again after the price fell.  He takes this as evidence of asymmetric price 
transmission due to market power.  However, US Stocks fell dramatically over the duration of the 
price peak
6.  It is not obvious that retail prices before and after the price spike should maintain the 
same relationship with wholesale prices despite the change in stock levels.  The point is that 
important ceteris paribus assumptions are violated when using anecdotal evidence.
7 
The VAR model that we have refined in this paper was originally developed for the 
express purpose of testing for asymmetric price transmission in US butter markets.
8  While 
allowances for asymmetric price transmission have been suppressed thus far, they can be easily 
reintroduced.  Instead of conditioning retail prices, say, on lagged wholesale price changes, we 
simply condition them on lagged wholesale price increases and decreases, separately.  We did this 
using an earlier, cruder model of coffee markets, and found no statistically significant evidence 
that price transmission was asymmetric.  We did, however, find that month old retail price 
increases led to current retail price increases, while month old retail price decreases did not lead 
to current retail price decreases.  This is suggestive of a price leadership game, with firms 
unwilling to be the first to raise prices.  This is consistent with the suggestion in commodity 
                                                 
6 According to stock data available from the Green Coffee Association of New York. 
7 Bettendorf &Verbofen (2000) look at the related and often confused issue of  incomplete price 
transmission, and argue that prices need not be transmitted fully when other, potentially non-constant, 
components of marginal cost exist. 
8 See Chavas & Mehta (2004). 
  12journals, that other roasters watch Folgers’ prices to determine when to respond to green coffee 
price increases.
9  
  This is not to say that market concentration is not a problem in coffee markets (nor that it 
is).  Indeed, our results on contemporaneous price transmission to the retail sector suggest the 
presence of ‘unexplained’ increases in marketing margins.  However, evidence of asymmetric 
price transmission is scant. 
 
VII.  Discussion 
Thus far, we have answered three and half out of the four questions posed.  First, we have 
ascertained that that the ICA did create a coffee price cycle.  It did so by providing future price 
stability, which encouraged supply response to price signals.  Our simulations of positive price 
shocks suggest that they will lead to a cycle, although the median impulse response does not dip 
very far into the negative region.  We also note that in order to restrict production to ICA quota 
restrictions coffee boards had to introduce a price wedge between wholesale and farm prices.  
This price wedge dampened price response at the one and two year horizon, and may even have 
reversed it when managers overshot in their estimates of the required wedge.  However, it is not 
clear that the price wedges actually dampened the cycle.  They may even have exacerbated it, by 
extending price upturns, leading to more planting and more serious downturns four to five years 
later. 
Second, we have simulated the effects of burning five million bags of coffee.  If this is 
done in the absence of a price stabilization mechanism, it will offer modest relief to farmers for 
one to two years, with prices returning to without-burn levels in two to three years.  A 15 cent/lb 
price increase from prices of 34 cents/lb represents a significant welfare improvement.  In 
December 2002, before subtracting the cost of the burn, it would have raised producer surplus by 
$765 million ($0.15/lb at 85 million remaining 60 lb. bags).  The cost, presuming these bags were 
purchased at the prevailing wholesale price of 46 cents/lb, would be $138 million.  The key 
questions, though, are who pays for the burn, which types of coffees to burn, and how to manage 
the expectation that such events would become regular.  Such an expectation, our results suggest, 
might generate supply response by stabilizing future prices or raising the relative prices of coffee 
varieties targeted for burning.  This would be counterproductive in the longer term. 
                                                 
9 It is also similar in spirit to the findings of Bewley (1999), who finds, in an Australian context, that 
movements in prices of certain instant coffee brands Granger-cause movements in others. 
  13Third, we looked for asymmetric price transmission and found little evidence of it, 
although there is evidence of what may be called marketing margin shocks.  These may be 
interpreted to suggest increasing market power. 
The final question, concerns supply response outside of the ICA, and what it tells us 
about why prices have remained so low for so long.  Our key finding is that supply response to 
price information at the aggregate level is rather weak in the absence of an agreement.  In part, 
this may be because in an unstable price environment farmers cannot use current price 
information to improve their investment decisions.  This finding allows us to advance a tentative 
explanation for the low prices of the last thirteen years.   
The statement that prices have been low for thirteen years requires clarification.  We 
argue that the low prices of the early 1990s and the last three years are expressions of the same 
phenomenon.  The two Brazilian frosts that raised prices substantially in the 1990s complicate the 
picture.     
Recent technological changes have allowed roasters to increase the substitutability of 
different beans, and to use what might formerly have been considered unusable beans.  
Generalizing liberally, this has led to a shift in comparative advantage in coffee from the “higher 
quality” shade-grown smallholder Arabicas of Central America, to the “lower quality” estate 
grown Robustas of Vietnam and Brazilian Arabicas.  These countries have responded by 
increasing supply drastically.  This in turn has depressed prices below the average production 
costs of all producers.  In a market for an annual or semi-annual crop, such an oversupply would 
conceivably be rectified within two or four years.  Given the longer term nature of investments in 
(and disinvestments from) coffee trees, and the lack of obvious alternatives to coffee production 
for smallholder operations, it is reasonable to presume that exit from coffee markets would take 
more time.   
Thirteen years of low prices, however, may be more than this simple adjustment cost 
story can explain.  We argue that our results provide an answer.  We have learned that in the 
absence of a price stabilization mechanism, supply response is slow, because making decisions 
that depend upon future prices when prices are volatile is difficult.  From  this perspective, the 
frosts of the 1990s may have made things worse. 
The problem may well be exacerbated by shortages of information.  Many smallholder 
coffee farms are in remote regions where even basic information, such as current local price 
levels, is unavailable.  Information about current international tree stocks and inventories is even 
more difficult to come by.  Hence, it is possible that the information necessary to forge careful 
exit decisions is simply unavailable. 
  14Looking to the future, the clear message from our results on this question is that price 
stabilization programs must be intelligently designed.  They must not attempt to raise prices too 
far above long run average production costs.  Nor must they reduce price uncertainty too much.  
Doing either will generate excess supply which may scupper the program itself.  It seems likely 
that the optimal mechanism will involve market sharing that allows for some price volatility and 
flexibility in quotas.  It would also involve longer term instruments to spread price risk at 
competitive rates.  The ICO should become a clearing house for information on tree and coffee 
stocks, and on the various government interventions in coffee markets.  It should also utilize such 
information to develop price forecasts, being certain not to underestimate price risk.  Further, 
given demand and supply inelasticity, any mechanism to control production will generate large 
quota rents. The distribution of these rents must be transparent and should not be tied to 
production. 
  Finally, a word on ‘fair trade’ coffee is probably in order.  One important change in the 
structure of the international coffee market associated with the formation of the ICA, is the 
expansion of tariffs on imports of processed coffee products into consuming nations.  This was a 
compromise with roasters concerned about rising raw materials costs under the agreement.  These 
tariffs remain in place thirteen years after the agreement’s collapse.  From this perspective, ‘fair 
trade’ coffee brands should be seen as a form of tariff jumping.  Tariff rents are captured by 
agents (fair trade roasters, retailers and coffee shops) acting domestically on behalf of foreign 
producers and sent back over the border.  Thus, in the context of an unmanaged market, they are a 
welfare enhancing response to a policy distortion.  We note however, that such interpretations 
would not apply to proposals to turn the entire market over to mandatory ‘fair trade’ mechanisms.  
Nor can such proposals be seriously addressed unless their provisions for managing supply and 
distributing quota rents are presented clearly. 
One thing is certain, though. Reductions in these tariffs will enhance the welfare of 
producing nations and of consumers through improvements in quality, variety and price 
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  16Table 1: Price Equation Parameter Estimates 
  Farm Price  Wholesale Price  Retail Price 
Effects of:  Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Constant  0.1125 0.0598 0.0132 0.0846 0.0553 0.0692
Monthly Time Trend  -0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002
d1  0.0029 0.0403 0.0061 0.0391 -0.0029 0.0234
d13     -0.0183 0.0429   
Quarter1  -0.0131 0.0178 -0.0072 0.0150 0.0245 0.0194
Quarter2  -0.0408 0.0174 -0.0232 0.0147 0.0144 0.0165
Quarter3  -0.0379 0.0182 -0.0120 0.0146 0.0252 0.0163
          
F
t p 1 −   0.9964 0.0792 0.3538 0.0938   
F
t p 1 − ∆   0.2012 0.1498 0.4551 0.1435   
F
t p 13 −      0.1784 0.0543   
F
t p 13 − ∆      -0.0915 0.0647   
W
t p 1 −   -0.0370 0.0750 0.7137 0.0777 0.1065 0.0350
W
t p 1 − ∆   -0.0127 0.1358 -0.2727 0.1487 0.1079 0.0783
W
t p 12 −      0.1023 0.0313   
W
t p 13 −      -0.2347 0.0572   
W
t p 13 − ∆      0.0818 0.0643   
R
t p 1 −      -0.0399 0.0244 0.9017 0.0301
R
t p 1 − ∆      -0.0060 0.0349 0.2115 0.0829
R
t p 13 −      0.0299 0.0314   
R
t p 13 − ∆      -0.0319 0.0317   
Parameters capturing medium term effects 
0 b      -0.0005 0.0677   
I b      -0.6104 0.5562   
A
I b      2.8441 1.0298   
II b      0.1205 0.3142   
A
II b      1.5284 0.6812   
III b      -0.5935 0.2459   
A
III b      0.1603 0.3218   
Parameters capturing long term effects 
IV ϕ      -0.6767 0.9228   
A
IV ϕ      0.0334 0.5555   
V ϕ      -0.7852 0.6116   
A
V ϕ      -3.4127 0.8131   
 
  17Table 2: Estimates of Parameters Determining Variance 
  Cholesky Equation 
  a1 a2 a3 
Effects of: Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Constant  0.0269 0.0057 -0.0134 0.0419 0.0798 0.0484 
d1  0.0798 0.0140 0.0619 0.0246 -0.0493 0.0122 
F
t p 1 −   0.0552 0.0228 0.2067 0.0308   
W
t p 1 −   -0.0355 0.0208 -0.0787 0.0305 0.0761 0.0169 
R
t p 1 −      0.0076 0.0136 -0.0241 0.0174 
Shock94  -0.0417 0.0354 0.0353 0.0320    
Shock99  -0.0338 0.0027 0.0187 0.0458   
  a4 a5 a6 
Effects of: Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Constant  0.0224 0.0192 0.1193 0.0804 0.1122 0.0706 
d1  0.0301 0.0289     -0.0116 0.0283 
F
t p 1 −   0.2074 0.0359 0.0044 0.0366   
W
t p 1 −   -0.0991 0.0386 -0.0040 0.0269 0.0090 0.0270 
R
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